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PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES WITHOUT
REGULATING PRIVATE LANDOWNERS: THE
CASE OF ENDANGERED PLANTS
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
Few areas of environmental law have inspired as much criticism as
the Federal Endangered Species Act ("ESA").' One of the principal crit-
icisms of the ESA is that, like most of the United States' environmental
laws, the ESA adopts a command and control approach to environmental
regulation. Command and control regulations define specific measures
that regulated entities must undertake, regardless of whether such meas-
ures are the most effective means of improving environmental quality.
Conventional wisdom is forming in environmental law that such regula-
tions are wasteful.2 Command and control regulations over-regulate
harmless activities, under-regulate harmful activities,3 and can even un-
dermine the goals they purport to advance. 4 In the case of the ESA, its
restrictions on private landowners are command and control regulations.
The ESA prohibits private landowners from altering the habitat of some
endangered species, thereby preventing these landowners from engaging
in activities such as logging, building housing, and farming. The ESA
imposes this restriction for all animal species, regardless of the cost or
the benefits of doing so.
t Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. B.A., The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity, 1988; M.A. (Psychology), The Johns Hopkins University, 1988; J.D., Stanford Univer-
sity, 1993; Ph.D. (Psychology), Stanford University, 1994. This Article benefitted from the
comments of participants in the Comell Journal of Law and Public Policy Symposium, Febru-
ary 1998, and from the invaluable research assistance of Anne Wahlig.
1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1530-44 (1994).
2 See generally PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEvELoPmENT, SusAInABLE
AMERmCA: A NEw CONSENSUS FOR PROSPERITY, OP'ORTUNrrY, AND A HEALTHY ENVIRoNMENT
FOR TE FUTURE (1996) (calling for greater flexibility and use of market forces in environmen-
tal regulation); Cass Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State,
48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 260-61, 267-68 (1996) (also calling for regulatory flexibility).
3 See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171 (1988) (argu-
ing that command and control regulations are wasteful); but see Howard A. Latin, Ideal Versus
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regu-
latory Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1267-72 (1985) (summarizing and responding to some
of these criticisms).
4 See, e.g., BRUCE A EmiAN & WLLIAm T. HASSLIER, CLzEAN CoALJDrRTY Am: OR
How He CLEAN Am AcT BECAME A MuLTLmIoN-DOLLAR BArL-OuT FOR THE HIGH SULFUR
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT (1981).
2 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Both proponents and opponents of conserving endangered species
cite the ESA's restrictions on private parties as its principal deficiency. 5
Critics of the ESA argue that the restrictions are unfair to landowners and
convert them from potential allies of endangered species into potential
enemies. These restrictions arguably encourage landowners to ensure
that no protected species ever sets foot on their property, or if one does,
to "shoot, shovel, and shut up."'6 Critics of the ESA also contend that
many private landowners would voluntarily conserve species on their
property but for the prospect of regulation by the federal government.7
The critics conclude from this analysis that this aspect of the ESA should
be eliminated.8
Eliminating the ESA's restrictions on private landowners would
likely produce one of two effects: it would either benefit endangered spe-
cies or harm them. Because lifting these restrictions would make harbor-
ing endangered species less costly to landowners, it might inspire them to
preserve important habitat voluntarily, thereby benefittingthese species.
Proponents of this reform, however, might be overstating landowners'
affinity for protecting endangered species. If landowners actually have
little regard for endangered species, then eliminating the ESA's restric-
tions would produce the opposite effect; such reform would free land-
owners to destroy habitat needed for the survival of endangered species.
Conducting the ideal experiment to determine which is the most
likely of these two outcomes would be impossible. Nevertheless, an im-
perfect experiment is already underway. This experiment is the inadver-
tent result of the combination of two seldom-noticed aspects of
endangered species protection in the United States. First, the ESA's re-
strictions on private landowners apply only to animal species, not plant
species. Second, marly states have adopted their own laws designed to
protect endangered species. In some of these states, the presence of en-
dangered plants on private land does restrict the landowners' activities.9
The resulting disparity in the laws of different states creates a natural
5 See CHARLES C. MANN & MARK L. PLUMME, NOAH's CHOICE: THE FUTruE OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES (1995); DAVID S. WILCoVE ET AL., REBUILDING THE AR.K: TOWARD A
MORE EI'acrrvE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (1996); Richard A. Epstein, Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapters of Oregon: The Law and Economics of Habitat Preservation, 5 SuP. CT.
ECON. REv. 1 (1997); Stephen Polasky et al., Endangered Species Conservation on Private
Land, 15 CoNTrI'Mp. EcON. PoL'Y 66 (1997); Richard L. Stroup, The Economics of Compensat-
ing Property Owners, 15 CoNrrna. EcON. POL'Y 55 (1997).
6 H. Jane Lehman, Skirmishes Carry Over Into Courtroom Series: Whose Land Is It?
The Final Part of a Three-Part Series on the Private-Property Rights Movement in the U.S.,
Cm. TRIB., Feb. 2, 1992, at Real Estate 1.
7 See, e.g., WIcovE Er A., supra note 5.
8 See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 5; Epstein, supra note 5; Stroup, supra note 5.
9 See infra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:1
Tim CASE OF ENDANGERED PLANTS
experiment that tests whether regulations restricting landowners harm or
help endangered species.
The analysis in this paper uses data from the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service ("FWS") to determine the outcome of this experiment.
Briefly stated, the analysis shows that plants that depend on private prop-
erty for their habitat do not fare well, and they fare much worse in those
states that do not restrict private landowners. Even if the ESA's restric-
tions create some incentives for landowners to destroy the habitat of en-
dangered species, the analysis in this paper suggests that these
restrictions benefit endangered species overall. Giving private landown-
ers unconstrained freedom to destroy habitat does not inspire voluntary
efforts that save species. Rather, it reduces species viability. The ESA's
goal of "conserv[ing] . . . endangered . . . and threatened species"'10
might be accomplished with a method that is fairer or more cost-effective
than restrictions on private landowners, but these restrictions further this
goal.
Part I of this paper briefly describes the ESA, along with the criti-
ques of the ESA's land-use restrictions. Part II elaborates on the law of
endangered species protection as it applies to plants. Part III describes
the methodology and results of the empirical analysis of the laws protect-
ing plants. Finally, part IV briefly discusses the implications of the
analysis.
I. THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT.
A. THE REGULATORY ENvmoNMrENT UNDER THE ESA
The FWS has primary responsibility for implementing the ESA."
The ESA charges the FWS with identifying those species that need its
protection because they are either endangered ("in imminent danger of
extinction") or threatened ("likely to become an endangered species
within the foreseeable future"). 12 For all species that the FWS identifies
as endangered or threatened ("listed" species), the FWS must draft and
implement a recovery plan designed to facilitate species recovery so that
10 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
11 The National Marine Fisheries Service ('NMFS"), rather than the FWS, has authority
over marine species. The NMFS and the FWS share jurisdiction over anadromous fish, which
live in both marine and freshwater environments. As this paper is concerned with private
landowners and plants, those species under the exclusive jurisdiction of the NMFS are ex-
cluded from the discussion and the empirical analysis.
12 16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (1994). The list of endangered and threatened animals is
found at Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1998); and the list of endan-
gered and threatened plants is found at Endangered and Threatened Plants, 50 C.F.R § 17.12
(1998).
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the species no longer needs the ESA's protection. 13 The ESA also autho-
rizes the FWS to purchase habitat for listed species. 14
Listed species also obtain important protection against being
harmed by the activities of other federal agencies. The ESA forbids any
agency of the federal government from taking any action that is "likely to
jeopardize the continued existence of any [listed] species."' 5 In addition,
no federal agency may take any action that would "result in the destruc-
tion or adverse modification of habitat of such [listed] species deter-
mined by [the FWS] ... to be critical."' 6 Finally, federal agencies are
supposed to carry "out programs for the conservation of [listed]
species."'17
The ESA also imposes restrictions on private parties. These restric-
tions vary betwepn plants and animals in important ways, but some re-
strictions apply to both. The ESA forbids the import, export, shipment in
interstate commerce, or commercial sale of any listed plant or animal
species. 18 The most controversial aspect of the ESA, however, applies
only to animals. The ESA makes it a crime to "take" any listed species
of fish or wildife. 19 The ESA defines "take" as "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture or collect or attempt to engage in
any such conduct."20 Since 1975, the FWS's definition of "harm" has
also included any "significant habitat modification or degradation where
it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential
behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering."'21 In or-
der to avoid "adverse modification" of habitat, a private landowner might
13 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(f)(1) (1994).
14 See 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994).
15 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
16 Id
17 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1). The case law on this requirement suggests that this is an
enabling provision rather than a requirement that agencies devote their resources completely to
conservation. See, e.g., Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy District v. Clark, 741 F.2d 257
(9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the ESA allows, but does not require, a federal agency to take
steps to encourage the recovery of a listed species).
18 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(A), (E), (F) (1994); 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(A), (C), (D)
(1994).
19 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1994). The ESA only prohibits the taking of "endan-
gered" species of fish or wildlife, but the FWS has extended this prohibition to "threatened"
species as well. See Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Threatened Wildlife, 50
C.F.R. § 17.31(a) (1998).
20 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1994).
21 Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Introduction and General Provisions,
50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1998). The FWS initially promulgated this regulation in 1975, and amended
it in 1981 to limit this prohibition to actions that actually kill or injure wildlife. See 40 Fed.
Reg. 44,412 (1975); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Final Redefinition of
'Harm," 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (1981).
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have to refrain from logging, farming, or developing property into a golf
course, a shopping mall, or residential housing.22
The ESA provides some exemptions to the restrictions on private
landowners. Landowners may obtain an "incidental take" permit from
the FWS, which would allow them to develop their property even though
doing so would harm a listed species.23 The FWS can grant such permits
to landowners that are willing to implement a habitat conservation plan
("HCP") for their property.24 The HCP must show how the proposed
development minimizes the adverse impact on protected species on the
property, and it also must show that the remaining impact will not drive
the species into extinction. Historically, these plans were expensive and
rarely approved by the FWS,25 but in recent years, the FWS has stream-
lined the approval process for HCPs.26 The FWS has also proposed
granting some small landowners outright exemptions from the restric-
tions against development of habitat.27 Despite the new exemptions, the
ESA, in combination with the FWS's regulations, still imposes substan-
tial restrictions on some private landowners.
B. EFFECT OF THE ESA's LAND-USE RESTRICTIONS
All sides of the debate on protecting endangered species are dissat-
isfied with the FWS's land-use restrictions. These restrictions have been
attacked by everyone from the Environmental Defense Fund to Don
Young, the conservative Congressman from Alaska.28 Critics argue that
the FWS's land-use restrictions make harboring a listed species too
costly for landowners. Professor Stroup's discussion of the ESA suc-
cinctly captures the essence of these critiques. 29 Professor Stroup char-
acterizes the restrictions as a "tax" on owning land that provides habitat
22 See Northwest Forest Resource Council v. Pilchuk Audubon Society, 97 F.3d 1161
(9th Cir. 1997) (logging impeded due to presence of an endangered bird species); MAm &
PLumwmR, supra note 5, at 180-211 (housing construction restricted); Maria Cone & Diana
Marcum, California and the West: Desert Bighorns to Get U.S. Protection, L.A. TIEas, Mar.
13, 1998, at A3 (construction of golf courses delayed); Species Protection and Sense: Legisla-
ture Can End Overkill Through Progressive Reform, L.A. TIs, Sept. 12, 1997, at B8 (farm-
ing and the construction of a shopping mall impeded by the ESA).
23 See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (1994).
24 See id.
25 See Eric Fisher, Comment, Habitat Conservation Planning Under the Endangered
Species Act: No Surprises and the Quest for Certainty, 67 U. CoLo. L. REv. 371, 373-74
(1996).
26 See J.B. Ruhl, Who Needs Congress? An Agenda for Administrative Reform Under the
Endangered Species Act, 6 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 367, 396-97 (1998).
27 See id. at 394-96.
28 See Wnucovw Er AL., supra note 5; Quane Kenyon, Endangered Species Bill Comes
Under Criticism: Alaska Congressman Says Amendment Doesn't Protect Property Rights,
IDAHo STATESMAN, Jan. 22, 1998, at 4B.
29 Stroup, supra note 5, at 59.
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for endangered species. He contends that these restrictions have the
same impact on the availability of habitat for listed species that an in-
come tax has on tax revenue. A small income tax generates revenue and
increases in the tax rate can increase revenue. As the tax rate rises, how-
ever, it makes undertaking the taxed activity less attractive. Conse-
quently, large increases in the tax rate eventually reduce tax revenue.
Professor Stroup argues that if the costs of the FWS's land-use restric-
tions are sufficiently high, they will actually reduce the amount of habitat
available for listed species.
The FWS's land-use restrictions might have an even greater impact
on species that are in decline, but that are not yet listed. Before declaring
a species to be endangered or threatened, the FWS must publish notices
of its intent to list a species in the Federal Register and in the newspapers
of affected communities.30 These notices warn landowners of the pros-
pect of future restrictions on the use of their property. Because it is per-
fectly legal to modify the habitat of unlisted species, this notification can
induce landowners to remove candidate species from their property or to
adversely modify their habitat before listing is final.31 Local landowners
might also organize to oppose the listing of a species, which can result in
expensive litigation over the listing decisions. Because the FWS has a
limited budget for listing species and a pervasive backlog of species that
need to be listed,32 the prospect of such litigation might affect the FWS's
decisionmaking, possibly imperiling species that need the ESA's
protection.
In addition to encouraging landowners to undertake legal activities
that harm species, the high cost of the FWS's land-use restrictions might
also encourage them to take illegal action. The penalties for knowing
violations of the ESA can be severe and include the possibility of a jail
sentence.3 3 The prospects for adequate enforcement of the ESA's prohi-
bition against adverse modification of habitat, however, are slim. Listed
species are scattered throughout all fifty states, and there are only limited
personnel available to enforce the ESA. The potential profits from de-
veloping species habitat might induce some landowners to "shoot,
shovel, and shut up,"34 even though such action is illegal.
The critics thus make a good case that the FWS's land-use restric-
tions create unintended incentives to harm species. Indeed, it is almost
30 See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5) (1994).
31 The FWS can avoid this by listing the species on an emergency basis, which then
gives it immediate protection. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(7) (1994).
32 See Oliver A. Houck, The Endangered Species Act and Its Implementation by the U.S.
Departments of Interior and Commerce, 64 U. COLO. L. REv. 277, 292-96 (1993).
33 See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1994) (a violation may be punished by imprisonment of
up to one year).
34 Lehman, supra note 6.
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economic dogma that land-use restrictions always create these sort of
unwanted incentives.35 Rent control, for example, is supposed to in-
crease the availability of low-cost housing in urban areas, but because it
reduces the value of rental properties, it also reduces their availability. 36
In the case of endangered species protection, however, the critics might
be overstating their argument. Unlike rent-control regulations, the ESA
imposes costs on the activities that it is seeking to deter. The FWS's
regulations simultaneously make destroying existing habitat and creating
new habitat costly for landowners. Thus, if the benefits to a species of
preserving existing habitat outweigh the costs of impeding the creation of
new habitat, then land-use restrictions will provide a net benefit for a
protected species.
Indeed, situations in which the FWS's land-use restrictions do more
harm than good to a listed species are probably the exception, not the
norm. The regulations diminish the available habitat for a listed species
only when several factors are present. First, existing habitat must be
disappearing despite the FWS's land-use restrictions. This result occurs
either because the habitat is in a natural state of transition or because the
penalties for violating the ESA are inadequate to deter people from ille-
gally destroying species habitat. Second, those who own land that might
attract a listed species must have a clear technique available to maintain
their property in an inhospitable state for the species. Third, this tech-
nique must be less costly than the land-use restrictions themselves.
Fourth, these circumstances must be widely understood by landowners.
Situations in which these four factors coincide sometimes arise and pro-
duce anecdotal support for the theory that land-use restrictions are harm-
ful to listed species,37 but it is not clear how common they are.
In the end, even though the FWS's land-use restrictions might cre-
ate unwanted incentives, with respect to the preservation of most species,
the restrictions are probably beneficial. Listed species might be better
off if landowners were compensated for the economic cost that the ESA
imposes, but in the absence of compensation, it is not clear that species
are in a worse state because of the FWS's land-use restrictions.
The effect of the land-use restrictions on states and municipalities is
uncertain. The ESA's prohibitions against jeopardizing the continued
existence of or destroying the critical habitat of any listed species do not
apply to state and local governments, but its prohibition against "taking"
35 See Stroup, supra note 5, at 56.
36 See Edgar 0. Olsen, An Econometric Analysis of Rent Control, 80 J. POL. EcoN. 1081
(1972).
37 See MANN & PLuMMER, supra note 5, at 180-211.
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does apply.38 Given the vast differences in amount and type of land that
states hold, states probably take a variety of different approaches to the
presence of endangered species on their lands. States that want to en-
courage development might well be subject to the same incentives to
destroy habitat that private parties face, whereas states with conserva-
tionist preferences might voluntarily use their land to preserve species.
II. ENDANGERED AND THREATENED PLANTS
A. FEDERAL PROTECTION OF ENDANGERED AND THREATENED PLANTS
The concern with perverse incentives, however, is irrelevant to
plants; the ESA's prohibition against "taking" listed species applies only
to animals. Consequently, the FWS's land-use restrictions do not affect
owners of land occupied by listed plants. Nothing in the ESA, or in the
accompanying FWS regulations, prevents landowners from killing any
plant on their property or from adversely modifying its habitat.
Nevertheless, the ESA includes some protection for listed plants.
The restrictions on federal agencies apply equally to plants and ani-
mals,39 and the ESA makes it illegal to "remove and reduce to posses-
sion" or "maliciously damage or destroy" 40 any listed plant on federal
land. The ESA also bans all commerce in listed plants,41 and it makes it
illegal to "remove, cut, dig up, or damage or destroy" a listed plant "in
knowing violation of any law or regulation of any State or in the course
of any violation of a State criminal trespass law."42 Absent any state
restriction, however, private landowners are free to destroy the habitat of
listed plants on their property. 43
Although the ESA does not directly affect private landowners' use
of their property, it can indirectly restrict their activities. Under certain
circumstances, private landowners need permission from a federal
38 The restriction against takings applies to any "person." 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)
(1994). The ESA's definition of "person" includes "any officer, employee, agent, department,
or instrumentality of ... any State, municipality, or political subdivision of a State." 16
U.S.C. § 1532(13) (1994).
39 See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
40 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(A) (1994).
41 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(C), (D) (1994).
42 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(A) (1994). Bootstrapping state violations into federal ones
may seem trivial, except that the penalties under the ESA often vastly exceed those provided
by state law. For example, the fine for violating New York's endangered plant statute is a
maximum fine of only $25. See N.Y. Envtl. Conserv. LAW § 9-1503(3) (Consol. 1982). Be-
cause a knowing violation of this state statute would also violate the ESA, the penalties may
actually be much greater.
43 The distinction between directly killing a species and dramatically reducing its pros-
pects for survival by destroying its habitat probably matters more for animals, which can tem-
porarily abandon their nests or burrows, than it does for plants. Developing a plant's habitat
probably entails directly "taking" the plant.
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agency to undertake development of their property, which an agency
might be unable to grant if the development would harm listed plants.
This situation occurs in at least four instances. First, those who own land
designated as a "wetland" under section 404 of the Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act must obtain a permit from the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Army Corps") before dredging and filling the wet-
land.44 The ESA forbids the Army Corps from granting such a permit if
doing so might jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or if
it would adversely alter land designated by the FWS as the critical
habitat of a listed species.45 Second, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act forbids the use of any pesticide in the United States
unless it is registered by the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA"). 46 Because of the ESA's prohibitions, the EPA may not register
a pesticide for any use that would jeopardize the continued existence of
any listed species or adversely alter the critical habitat of any listed spe-
cies. This requirement thereby restricts private individuals' use of pesti-
cides.47 Third, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC")
may not grant a license to generate and to sell electricity from a dam if
its construction and operation would jeopardize a listed plant or harm the
critical habitat of a listed plant.48 Fourth, any construction project that
benefits from federally-subsidized loans or insurance programs might be
affected by the presence of a listed plant.49
These indirect restrictions encourage the destruction of listed plants.
Because the ESA does not prohibit private landowners from taking listed
plants, landowners may eliminate listed plants so as to free themselves
from restrictions. Consider the wetlands program as an example. Land-
owners concerned that the presence of a listed plant on their property will
cause the Army Corps to deny an application for a dredge-and-fill permit
for a wetland are free to eradicate all listed plants from their property
before applying for the permit. Unless the FWS has designated the wet-
land as the critical habitat of a listed species, the destruction of the plants
also removes the constraints on the Army Corps, allowing them to grant
the construction permit. Pesticide registration, FERC licensing, and fed-
erally-subsidized construction projects present similar issues. The com-
44 See 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994).
45 See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Biodiversity and Land, 83 CoRmu.L L. REv. 1, 61-62
(1997).
46 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a) (1994).
47 Information on the scope and extent of EPA's pesticide restrictions that are designed
to protected listed species can be found on the Internet. See United States Environmental
Protection Agency, Endangered Species Protection Program (visited May 28, 1998) <http:ll
www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/endanger/>.
48 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-835r (1994).
49 See Katharine Rosemary, The Effect of the Endangered Species Act on Housing Con-
struction, 33 HASANGS L.J. 551 (1982).
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bination of unconstrained landowners and constrained federal agencies
produces incentives for landowners to eliminate any listed plants before
requesting agency permission for their activities.50
The FWS could eliminate this incentive to destroy the habitat by
designating property as a species' critical habitat. Federal agencies may
not aid in the destruction of land designated as critical habitat, regardless
of the presence or absence of a listed plant on that habitat. The FWS,
however, has designated critical habitat for only twenty-four of the 669
listed plants.5 1 This leaves most plants in wetlands, on farms, and in
riparian settings at severe risk of destruction by private landowners. En-
dangered plants that grow on private property might be better off if they
are not listed.
Other than these unusual cases, the ESA creates few incentives
either to destroy or to preserve listed plants on private property. Listing
provides some protection for those plants that inhabit federal land. It
also adds federal protection to plants protected by state law, including
state trespass laws. For the most part, the ESA relegates the fate of listed
plants on private land to the benevolence of the landowner.
B. STATE LAWS PROTECTING PLANTS
Most states and territories have adopted their own endangered spe-
cies statutes, some of which protect endangered plants. Even though the
ESA does not directly prohibit private landowners from destroying listed
plants, several jurisdictions have statutes that do. Furthermore, because a
knowing violation of any state statute protecting listed plants also vio-
lates the ESA,52 in those jurisdictions that restrict private landowners, the
ESA also restricts private landowners. The substantive provisions of the
ESA and the FWS regulations, therefore, are only a part of the law pro-
tecting endangered and threatened plants.
Most states and territories do not, however, protect endangered
plants. Nineteen states, Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia have
50 Although the ESA creates this incentive, it is unclear how often private parties elimi-
nate listed plants to avoid federal restrictions. Mann and Plummer reported one such incident,
in which a construction company bulldozed a population of the endangered San Diego mesa
mint to facilitate a loan from the Veterans Administration. See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note
5, at 187 (reporting that this incident was part of an effort by the landowner to avoid the
restriction against "taking" before the mesa mint became officially listed).
51 This number was determined by searching the two databases of listed plants for plants
that have critical habitat designations. See United States Fish & Wildlife Service, Division of
Endangered Species, U.S. Listed Flowering Plant Species Index By Lead Region and Status, as
of April 30, 1998 (visited May 28, 1998) <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/pltldata.htnl>;
United States Fish & Wildlife Service, Division of Endangered Species, U.S. Listed Non-
Flowering Plant Species Index By Lead Region and Status, as of April 30, 1998 (visited May
28, 1998) <http:llwww.fws.gov/r9endspp/plt2data.html>.
52 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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no laws pertaining to endangered or threatened plants.53 Another nine
states have statutes that authorize the creation of a state list of endan-
gered plants, but do not provide any substantive protection to plants on
private land in addition to that provided by the ESA.54 Some of these
jurisdictions have adopted restrictions that duplicate those contained in
the ESA. For example, Texas forbids taking protected plants from public
land for commercial purposes,55 but because the ESA also forbids the
commercial sale of endangered plants,56 this restriction is redundant. In
summary, the laws in twenty-eight states, Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia do not protect plants on private land more than the ESA
does. 5
7
Most of the remaining jurisdictions add only minimal protection for
listed plants. The laws in thirteen states forbid anyone from taking a
protected plant from private property without the permission of the land-
owner.58 For the most part, these statutes duplicate the ESA's prohibi-
tion against harming a listed plant while violating state criminal trespass
laws.59 These "permission" statutes might make it somewhat easier for a
private landowner that is inclined to preserve species to protect them, but
in these states landowners may still legally destroy protected plants.
53 The nineteen states with no relevant laws are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
54 The nine states are Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey,
New Mexico, Rhode Island, and Texas. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 12-6-170 to 12-6-176 (1996);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 146.600-.619 (Banks-Baldwin 1996); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs.
§ 10-2A (1990 & Supp. 1997); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 430-438 (1993); NEv. REv. STAT.
§§ 527.260- .300 (1986); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 13:1B-15.151 to 13:1B-158 (1991); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 75-6-1 (Michie 1994); R.I. GEN. LAws § 20-37 (1989); TEx. REv. CIV. CODE AtN.
§§ 88.001-.012 (West 1991).
55 See TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. § 88.008(a) (West 1991).
56 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(C) (1994).
57 The law in two of these states is somewhat ambiguous, but probably does not add any
substantive protection for endangered plants. Nevada requires landowners to obtain a permit
before removing any protected plant species from their property, but does not specify the
circumstances that justify granting or denying a permit. See NEv. REv. STAT. § 527.270
(1986). New Mexico's endangered plant law authorizes a state agency to adopt regulations
restricting the taking of protected plants, but the agency has not done so. See N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 75-6-1(D) (Michie 1994).
58 The thirteen states are Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-311 (Supp. 1998); FLA. STAT. ch. 581.185(3) (Supp. 1998); 520 ILL.
CoMP. STAT. 10/3 (1993); Mo. REV. STAT. § 252.240(5) (West 1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 217-A:9 (Supp. 1997); N.Y. ENvL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-1503(5) (Consol. 1982); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 16-202.19(a)(1) (1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1518.02 (Anderson 1997); OR. REv.
STAT. § 564.120(2) (1988); 32 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5307(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-8-
309(a) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-1023 (Michie 1994); Wis. STAT. § 29.415(4)(c) (1989 &
Supp. 1997).
59 See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(2)(B) (1994).
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California and Arizona have adopted somewhat unique endangered
plant protection statutes.60 Their statutes resemble the "permission" stat-
utes described above, but they also forbid landowners from destroying a
protected plant without first informing a state conservation agency of
their intent to do so, and then refraining from destroying the plant for a
short period of time. During this waiting period, the state conservation
agency may enter the property and transplant the plant.61 It is unclear
how successful these transplant programs are. If the primary threat to the
species is the widespread loss of habitat, then providing the opportunity
to transplant plants might be a meaningless exercise. Nevertheless, these
"notice" statutes represent a compromise between the interests of the
landowner and the preservation of the species. Construction delays
caused by these statutes might impose some costs on landowners, but far
less than the costs of a prohibition on development. At the same time, if
the transplant is successful, the benefit to the species could be
tremendous.
Finally, seven states, Guam, and the Virgin Islands prohibit private
landowners from killing or adversely modifying the habitat of any pro-
tected plant.62 Two of these jurisdictions have exceptions; Massachu-
setts law allows a private landowner to construct a single family dwelling
even if doing so would result in the taking of a protected plant,63 and
Minnesota law exempts some farmers from this restriction.64 Otherwise,
the presence of listed plants imposes the same restrictions on landowners
in these jurisdictions that the presence of listed animals does. It is nota-
ble that one of these jurisdictions, Hawaii, is also probably the most sig-
nificant battleground in endangered plant protection. Hawaii contains
the exclusive habitat of 263 listed plants, which is 39.3% of the total
number of listed plants.65 Overall, 283 plants (42.3% of the total) have
60 See Aiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-901 to 3-934 (West 1995); CAL. FISH & GAME CODE
H9 1900-1913 (West 1984).
61 In Arizona, the delay depends upon the size of the property being cleared of protected
plants: 20 days for less than one acre, 30 days for between one and 40 acres, and 60 days for
more than 40 acres. See AIZ. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 3-903(A)(3) (West 1995). In California, the
landowner must provide 10 days notice. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1913(c) (West 1984).
California also only applies this restriction to landowners that are given notice of the presence
of a protected plant on their property by the state department of fish and game. See id.
62 The seven states are Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Michigan, South Da-
kota, and Vermont. See HAw. Rnv. STAT. § 195D-4(e) (1997); IowA CODE § 481B.5 (Supp.
1998); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 131A, § 2 (Supp. 1998); MIcH. Comp. LAws § 36505 (Supp.
1998); MINN. STAT. § 84.0895 (Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFmD LAWS § 34A-8 (Michie 1992);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5403 (1997); see also 5 GuAM CODE ANN. § 63206(b) (1995); V.I.
CODE ANN. tit 12, § 105 (1995).
63 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 131A, § 3 (Supp. 1998).
64 See MiNN. STAT. § 84.0895 (Supp. 1995).
65 The total number of listed plant species was found on the Internet. See United States
Fish & Wildlife Service, Division of Endangered Species, Endangered Species Home Page
(visited May 28, 1998) <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/boxscore.html>. The number of spe-
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at least some habitat in states and territories that prohibit private land-
owners from taking listed plants. 66
Table 1 summarizes state and territorial law regarding endangered
and threatened plants on private land. Each jurisdiction can be classified
as having adopted one of four types of statutes: statutes that prohibit
landowners from taking protected species on private land ("restriction"
statutes); statutes that require landowners to provide notice to a state
agency before they take a protected species on private land ("notice"
statutes); statutes that prohibit taking protected species on private land
without the permission of the landowner ("permission" statutes); and
statutes that do not add any substantive protection in addition to that
provided by the ESA (including jurisdictions that have not adopted stat-
utes regarding endangered or threatened plants).
In most jurisdictions, the law is silent as to restrictions on state
agencies and on the status of protected species on state or territorial land.
Of the nine jurisdictions with restriction statutes, four also explicitly pro-
hibit state and local entities from taking protected species.67 In the other
five jurisdictions, the statutes do not refer to state and local entities, but
they also probably restrict state and territorial entities in the same way
that they restrict private parties. Five other jurisdictions prohibit state
and local entities from using property in ways that harm protected plants;
Connecticut and Wisconsin have adopted restrictions similar to those that
the ESA places on federal agencies,68 and Arizona, Florida, and Oregon
require state agencies to consult with a state wildlife commission on
projects that harm protected plants and to consider alternatives to such
projects.69
The jurisdictions that require permission from a landowner before a
protected plant may be removed also presumably require such permis-
sion when the landowner is the state, although only Florida specifically
requires such permission.70 In addition, three of the thirteen states with
permission statutes, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Ohio, forbid
cies in Hawaii was also found on the Internet. See United States Fish & Wildlife Service,
Division of Endangered Species, Region 1 Listed Species Under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
Jurisdiction By State, as of 04/30/98 (visited May 28, 1998) <http:lwww.fws.gov/r9endspp/
statl-rl.btml>.
66 The number of species found in the nine jurisdictions with restriction statutes was
found on the Internet. See United States Fish & Wildlife Service, Division of Endangered
Species, State Lists of Endangered Species Under U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Jurisdiction
(By Service Region) (visited May 28, 1998) <http://www.fws.gov/r9endspp/stat-reg.htnl>.
67 The four states are Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Guam. See HAw. Rnv. STAT.
§ 195D-2 (1997); IowA CODE § 481B.1(6) (Supp. 1998); MASs. Gm. LAWS ch. 131A, § 1
(Supp. 1998); 5 GuAM CODE ANN. § 632030) (1995).
68 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 26-310 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 29.415(6r) (Supp. 1997).
69 See A=z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-905 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ch. 581.185 (Supp.
1998); OR. REv. STAT. § 564.115 (1988).
70 See Fla. Stat. ch. 581.185(3) (Supp. 1998).
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TABLE 1: STATE AND TERRITORIAL LAW REGARDING LISTED PLANTS
Taking of
Landowners protected species
Landowners must provide prohibited No substantive restrictions on
prohibited from notice before without private parties
taking protected taking protected permission of
species species landowner Statute that adds
("restriction") ("notice") ("permission") no protection No Statute
Hawaii, Iowa, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Alabama,
Massachusetts, California. Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Alaska,
Michigan, Missouri, New Maryland, Arkansas,
Minnesota, Hampshire, New Nebraska, Colorado,
South Dakota, York, North Nevada, New Delaware,
Vermont, Guam, Carolina, Ohio, Jersey, New Idaho, Indiana,
the Virgin Oregon, Mexico, Rhode Kansas,
Islands. Pennsylvania, Island, Texas. Louisiana,
Tennessee, Maine,
Virginia, Mississippi,
Wisconsin. Montana, North
Dakota,
Oklahoma,
South Carolina,
Utah,
Washington,
West Virginia,
Wyoming,
District of
Columbia,
Puerto Rico.
harming protected plants on any state land;71 and one jurisdiction, Penn-
sylvania, forbids harming protected plants on state parks and preserves.72
Furthermore, even though it does not have a general permission statute,
Georgia also forbids the taking of protected plants from state land with-
out permission from the state.73 Among the remaining jurisdictions, only
one has any law dealing with endangered plants on state and territorial
land; Texas forbids taking any protected species from state land for com-
mercial purposes.74 The remaining jurisdictions, however, presumably
treat plants on state and territorial land as the property of the state or
territory. Removing such plants might violate state trespass law, even
without a statute specifically protecting endangered or threatened plants.
Some state land-use restrictions, other than statutes dealing directly
with endangered plants, can indirectly restrict private landowners. As
noted above, two states, Connecticut and Wisconsin, have adopted stat-
utes restricting state agencies in the same way that the ESA restricts fed-
eral agencies, forcing them to deny permits to private parties for any
71 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 26-311 (1990); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 217-A:9 (Supp.
1997); Omo REv. CODE AN. § 1518.02 (Anderson 1997).
72 See 32 PA. CoNs. STAT. § 5311(a) (1997).
73 See GA. CODE ANq. § 12-6-170 to 12-6-173 (1996).
74 See TEX. R-v. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 88.008(a) (West 1991).
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activity that might endanger protected species.75 Other states also re-
quire permits for certain activities, which are more difficult to obtain if
the underlying activity harms protected plants. For example, California
requires that private parties submit a timber harvest plan before it will
allow any logging that would disturb protected plants.76 Similarly, New
Mexico makes it more difficult to obtain a mining permit if protected
plants inhabit the mining site.77 In New York, any agency activity that
"may have a significant effect on the environment" requires an environ-
mental impact statement that must describe (among other things) any ad-
verse consequences to any protected plant species.78 Finally, any
municipality can alter its zoning ordinances to protect endangered plant
species on private property from development. A private party could
avoid these impediments to obtaining permission for their activities by
completely eradicating the protected plant species from their property
before applying for permission. These indirect restrictions create the
same incentives for private landowners to eliminate protected species
that indirect federal restrictions do.79
The thirty-three jurisdictions that have adopted laws governing en-
dangered and threatened plants all have their own lists of protected plant
species, aside from the federally listed species.8 0  Most jurisdictions
(twenty-six) automatically include any species designated as endangered
or threatened by the FWS on their own list of protected species. The
75 See CoN. GEN. STAT. § 26-310 (1990); Wis. STAT. § 29.415(6r) (Supp. 1997).
76 See CAL. PuB. REs. CODE § 4581-4592 (West 1984) (general requirements that timber
harvest plan be submitted); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 1038(b)(7) (1998) (no exemptions
from preparing a timber harvest plan if endangered plants will be disturbed by logging).
77 See 7 N.M. Reg. 1174 (1998).
78 N.Y. ENVL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109 (Consol. 1982) (requiring an environmental
impact statement); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & RErs. tit. 6, § 617.11(a)(2) (1998). See, e.g.,
West Branch Conservation Ass'n, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 177 A.D. 2d 917, 576 N.Y.S. 2d 675
(1991) (presence of endangered plant on site planned for housing development required the
drafting of a full environmental impact statement).
79 See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
80 See Am. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3-903(B)(1) (West 1995); CorN. GEN. STAT. § 26-
304(7), (8) (1990); FLA. STAT. ch. 581.185(2)(b) (Supp. 1998); HAw. REv. STAT. § 195D-4(a)
(1997); 520 ILL. CoaN. STAT. 10/2 (Supp. 1998); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 146.605 (Banks-
Baldwin 1996); MD. CODE ANN., NAT. REs. § 10-2A-01(d) (Supp. 1997); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ch. 131A, § 1 (Supp. 1998); Mo. REv. STAT. § 252.240 (West 1990); NEE. REv. STAT.
§ 431(4) (1993); N.H. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 217-A:3(M) (1997); N.J. REv. STAT. § 13:1B-
15.153 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 75-6-1(A) (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16-202.12(4)
(1995); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1518.01 (Anderson 1997); OR. Rev. STAT. § 564.100(3)(b)
(1988); R.I. GEN. LAws § 20-37-2(3) (1989); TENN. CODE ANN. § 70-8-303(a)(5) (1995); TEx.
REv. CrV. CODE AM. § 88.002 (West 1991); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5401(6), (7) (1997);
Wis. STAT. § 29.415(3) (1989); 5 GUAM CODE ANN. § 63203(e) (1995); V.I. CODE ANN. tit.
12, § 102(e) (1995). Three states, Iowa, Michigan, and South Dakota, maintain separate lists
of protected species, but extend the same protections to species on the federal list as they do to
species on their own list. See IowA CODE § 481B.5 (Supp. 1998); MICH. Coap. LAWS
§ 36505(1)(c) (Supp. 1998); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34A-8-9(4) (Michie 1992).
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other seven jurisdictions,8' however, do not automatically include the
federally listed plants on their own lists. Some federally listed plants in
these jurisdictions might therefore not be protected by the states' endan-
gered plant statutes.
Ell. THE PRESENT STUDY
The present study was designed to determine the effect that statutes
restricting private landowners have on protected species. To accomplish
this, the condition of listed plant species was compared to that of animal
species. Because the presence of a listed plant species on private land
does not usually restrict a landowner's activities in the way that the pres-
ence of a listed animal species does, this comparison provided some indi-
cation of the effects of laws restricting landowners on protected species.
The condition of plant species on habitat owned by different types of
parties was also analyzed to determine whether private ownership of
habitat generally contributes to the decline of listed plant species. Fi-
nally, the effects of the four types of state and territorial law on listed
plant species, both on and off of privately owned land, were assessed.
A. DATA AND METHODS
The 1988 amendments to the ESA require the FWS to generate bi-
annual reports on the endangered species program.82 As of this writing,
the FWS has produced reports for 1990, 1992, and 1994.83 Data from
the 1994 FWS Report served as the basis for the present analysis. This
Report included data on the 891 species (410 animals and 481 plants)
listed at the time that the Report was issued. It identified each species'
population as improving, stable, declining, extinct, or unknown. This
designation (hereinafter referred to as "species status" or "status") pro-
vided the primary dependent variable for the present analysis.
As a measure of how well listed species are faring, species status
has its faults. This parameter has been criticized by the National Re-
81 The other seven jurisdictions are California, Georgia, Minnesota, Nevada, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Virginia. See CAL. FISH & GAME CODE § 1901 (West 1984); GA. CODE
ANN. § 12-6-172(a) (1996); MINN. STAT. § 84.0895 (1995); N.Y. ENVnL. CONSERV. LAW § 9-
"1502 (Consol. 1982); 32 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5307 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 3.1-1021 (Michie
1994).
82 See Endangered Species Act, Pub. L. No. 100-478, §§ 1002-1004, 102 Stat. 2306,
2307 (1988); 16 U.S.C. § 1533(t(3) (1994).
83 See U.S. FISH AND WILDiI SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM (1990); U.S. FISH AND
WIDLFE SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS, ENDANGERED AND
THRmATEED SPECIES RECOVERY PROGRAM (1992); U.S. FISH AND WmDFE SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT TO CONGRESS, RECOVERY PROGRAM, ENDANGERED AND
TREATErn SPECIES (1994) (hereinafter 1994 FWS REPORT).
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search Council as too subjective.84 The FWS has not clearly described
its criteria for determining species status. 85 Furthermore, species status
does not always provide an accurate indication of a species' true viabil-
ity. The FWS has designated some species that are on the brink of ex-
tinction as stable. The entire population of Presidio Manzanita trees, for
example, consists of a single specimen, but nevertheless the FWS desig-
nated the species as stable.86 It is true that the remaining tree is currently
healthy, but designating the Presidio Manzanita as stable seems inappro-
priate under the circumstances. Despite these problems, species status
should correlate with the actual condition of species. Noise and error in
the dependent measure might obfuscate small effects, but strong, accu-
rate trends should still emerge, if they exist.
Ownership of species habitat was identified from the FWS's an-
nouncement of its final determination that a species is endangered or
threatened. The FWS publishes these announcements in the Federal
Register along with findings necessary to support its determination. For
each plant species, these findings include a detailed description of the
habitat, which includes a description of how the habitat is being used. In
the case of habitat held by the federal government, the FWS also identi-
fies the federal agency that manages it. For this analysis, habitat owners
were classified into one of fourteen different categories. The Federal
Register announcements identify six different federal owners: the Bureau
of Land Management ("BLM"), the United States Forest Service
("USFS"), the National Park Service ("NPS"),87 the National Wildlife
Refuges ('NWR"), the Department of Defense ("DoD"), and Native
American reservations. State land was divided by use into three catego-
ries: wildlife refuges and preserves, state and local parks, and all other
state land (which commonly included roadsides and highway medians).
Private land was divided by use into five categories: land subject to resi-
dential or commercial development (including presently undeveloped
land that is likely to be developed), agricultural land other than range or
pasture land, grazing land (range or pasture land), undeveloped land
(land not suitable for any of the previous uses), and land identified by the
FWS as held privately for the protection of listed species. Table 2 sum-
marizes the fourteen types of owners. The percentage of each plant spe-
cies' habitat held by each of these fourteen types of owner was
determined from the Federal Register announcements. Unfortunately, re-
84 See NATIONAL REs-ARcH CouNcIL, SCIENCE Am THE ENDARGmm SPECIES AcT
197-98 (1995).
85 See id.
86 See 1994 FWS REPORT, supra note 83, at 57; Determination that Arctostaphylos
hookeri ssp. ravenii is an Endangered Species, 44 Fed. Reg. 61,910 (1990).
87 This analysis treated wilderness areas and national monuments as NPS land because of
the similar status of these areas.
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liable data on the ownership of the habitat of animal species was not
available for a sufficient percentage of the animal species to provide a
meaningful analysis.
TABLE 2: OWNER CATEGORIES USED IN THE ANALYSIS
FEDERAL LAND
1. Bureau of Land Management ("BLM")
2. United States Forest Service ("USFS")
3. National Park (including wilderness areas and national monuments) ("NPS")
4. National Wildlife Refuges ("NWR")
5. Department of Defense ("DoD")
6. Native American Reservation
STATE (OR TERRirroRiAL) LAND
7. State Wildlife Refuge or Preserve
8. State (or Local) Park
9. Other State Land
PRIVATE LAND
10. Residential/Commercial (including undeveloped land likely to be developed)
11. Agricultural (other than range or pasture land)
12. Range or Pasture Land
13. Undeveloped Land
14. Privately Protected Land
A few other variables were determined from the information in the
Federal Register announcements. For each species, three composite
landowner variables were created, corresponding to the total percentage
of habitat held by federal, state, or private landowners. Also, the pre-
dominant landowner of the three was identified (i.e., the landowner that
held the greatest percentage of each species' habitat). Furthermore, spe-
cies described by the FWS as relying on wetlands were recorded as such.
The Federal Register announcements also identify the states or terri-
tories containing the species' habitat. This information was used to des-
ignate the type of state or territorial law that applied to each species.
Species with habitat in multiple jurisdictions were designated as pro-
tected by the law of the jurisdiction(s) that contained a majority of the
species' habitat. For example, a species with habitat equally divided be-
tween three jurisdictions, two with restriction statutes and one without
any laws regarding endangered plants, would have been designated as
being protected from taking by private landowners. Species in the seven
jurisdictions that maintain lists of protected species separate from the
federal list were designated as being unprotected unless they were also
included on the state list.88 As a result, two species in Virginia and sev-
88 Three species were federally listed before the jurisdictions that include a majority of
their habitat adopted their plant protection statutes. In New Hampshire, Robin's cinquefoil
was listed in 1980, but not protected by New Hampshire law until 1987. In Oregon, MacFar-
lane's four-o'clock was listed in 1979 and Malheur wire-lettuce was listed in 1982, but neither
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enteen species in California that were federally-listed, but not protected
by these states, were designated as unprotected, even though the majority
of their habitat lies in jurisdictions that provide more protection for listed
plants than the ESA.89
B. RESULTS
1. Plants Versus Animals
Table 3 shows the status of plants, overall. No listed plant species
was known to have gone extinct, but 29.7% were declining and 39.8%
had an unknown status. Only 23.0% were known to be stable and only
7.5% were known to be improving. In other words, fewer than one-third
of the listed plant species are known to have a status suggesting that they
would survive.
TABLE 3: STATUS OF PLANT SPECIES
Plant Species With a
Status All Plant Species Known Status
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Improving 36 7.5 36 12.4
Stable 111 23.0 111 38.3
Declining 143 29.7 143 49.3
Extinct 0 0.0 0 0.0
Unknown 192 39.8 - -
Total 482 100.0 290 100.0
Although the percentage of species known to be stable or improving
was low, the situation for plants was probably not as bleak as this finding
suggests. Excluding species with an unknown status in the present anal-
ysis revealed that roughly half of the listed plant species with a known
was protected by Oregon law until 1987. Because all three species had been protected for a
substantial period of time (seven years) at the time of the 1994 FWS REPORT, they were treated
as if they had been protected throughout their history. A few other species had some presence
in jurisdictions that had no endangered plant statutes at the time that they were listed but later
passed such statutes: St. Thomas Prickley and Ash Vahl's boxwood (both listed in 1985, and
protected by the Virgin Islands since 1990); and sandplain gerardia and small-whorled pogonia
(listed in 1988 and 1982, respectively, and protected by Massachusetts since 1990). However,
none of these four plants had a majority of their habitat in these jurisdictions.
89 The two Virginia species were the Virginia round-leaf birch and the sensitive joint-
vetch. The seventeen California species were the Truckee barberry, the San Bernardino
Mountains bladderpod, the Cushenbury buckwheat, the Bakersfield cactus, the Parish's daisy,
the San Benito evening-primrose, the San Clemente Island larkspur, the Kern mallow, the
Cushenbury milk-vetch, the Cushenbury oxytheca, the McDonald's rock-cress, the Ben
Lomond spineflower, the Monterey spineflower, the Robust spineflower, the Slender-homed
spineflower, the Hoover's woolly-star, and the San Joaquin wooly-threads.
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status were stable or improving, as shown in Table 3. Furthermore, pre-
vious analysis of these data indicated that those species identified as un-
known were as likely to be eventually found to be stable or improving as
those species with a known status. 90 This earlier analysis also indicated
that recently listed species tended to be declining.91 The longer that a
species was protected, the more likely it was to be stable or improving. 92
In the present analysis, the correlation between the number of years a
plant species had been protected and whether it was stable or improving,
as opposed to declining, was .20.93 This means that for each additional
year that a plant had been protected, it was two percent more likely to be
stable or improving, as opposed to declining.94
The condition of plant species was similar to that of animal species.
Among the 329 listed animal species with a known status, 46.2%, 38.0%,
and 12.5% were declining, stable, and improving, respectively.95 Ex-
cluding extinct species, this distribution of species status did not differ
significantly from that of plants described in Table 3.96 Among the ani-
mals, however, one sub-category of species, the clams, had a dispropor-
tionate impact on the summary statistics. Among the fifty-six listed
clams species, only one was known to be stable or improving, while
forty-seven were declining, three were extinct, and five had an unknown
status. The percentage of clam species with a known status that were in
decline (97.9%) was far greater than that of any other category of spe-
cies.97 With the clam species removed, the animals appeared to be in
better condition than the plants; among the remaining 278 animal species
90 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Noah by the Numbers: An Empirical Evaluation of the En-
dangered Species Act, 82 CoRNm.L L. R . 356, 375-76 (1997).
91 See id. at 376-77.
92 See id. at 377-78. Some animal species were listed before the 1973 amendments to
the ESA implemented the protections described in this paper. These species were therefore
protected for 21 years at the time of the 1994 FWS REPORT, although they had been listed
longer than that.
93 This correlation coefficient was statistically significant. t(288) = 3.42, p < .001. For a
description of the statistical test involved in this analysis, see JACOB CohEN & PATRICIA Co-
HEN, APPLIED MuLTnLE REGREsSION/CoRRELATION ANALYSIS FOR TFi BEHAvxoRAL ScmNCFs
52-53 (2d ed. 1983). Throughout this paper, the word "significant" denotes a statistically
reliable finding in which the null hypothesis can be rejected at a probability of less than .05.
94 This was determined by regressing a binary variable indicating whether a species was
stable or improving, as opposed to declining, on the number of years a species has been pro-
tected. Regression analysis is described fully in CoHEN & CoHEN, supra note 93. The beta
coefficient for the years of protection was .02.
95 3.3% of the animals were extinct.
96 X(2) = 0.14, p > .5. The X statistic is described in WnLAM L. HAYS, STATISTICS
536-73 (3d ed. 1981).
97 The following were the percentages of known species that were declining among the
other groups of animals: mammals, 42.5%; birds, 35.4%; reptiles, 42.9%; amphibians, 50.0%;
fishes, 38.0%; snails, 38.9%; crustaceans, 44.4%; insects, 38.9%; and arachnids were indeter-
minate (all four species had an unknown status). See Rachlinski, supra note 90, at 373-74
n.128.
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with a known status, 37.8%, 45.0%, and 14.4% were declining, stable,
and improving, respectively. This distribution (excluding the eight ex-
tinct animal species) was significantly different from that of the plants.98
The animal species, however, had been protected longer than the plant
species. Animals had been protected for an average of 13.2 years, as
opposed to an average of 6.8 years for plants. This difference was statis-
tically significant.99 Once this difference was taken into account, the
percentage of animal species that were stable or improving did not differ
from the percentage of plants that were stable or improving.100
2. Land Ownership and Species Status
Land ownership patterns influenced the status of plant species. Re-
gression analysis revealed that the percentages of species habitat held by
federal, state, or private landowners significantly predicted whether a
species was stable or improving, as opposed to declining. 101 A separate
regression showed that the fourteen different landowner percentages also
significantly predicted whether a species was stable or improving, as op-
posed to declining. 10 2 Among those species that were stable or improv-
ing, the percentages of habitat held by federal, state, or private
landowners did not significantly predict whether a species was improv-
98 X2(2) = 6.16, p < .05.
99 t(459) = 12.0, p < .001.
100 To determine the difference in status between plants and animals while controlling for
the effect of the number of years that species had been protected, two regression equations
were run and compared. The first regressed the species status (stable or improving, versus
declining) on the number of years that the species had been protected; the second was the same
except that it added a dummy code predictor variable identifying each species as a plant or
animal. This addition explained no more variance in the dependent variable than the first
regression and hence there was no difference between the percentage of plant species that were
stable or improving and the percentage of animal species that were stable or improving aside
from the difference in the length of time each type of species had been protected. This statisti-
cal technique is described in COHEN & COHEN, supra note 93, at 97-103, and it was used
throughout this analysis to control for the effect of the number of years that species had been
protected.
101 F(2, 287) = 6.05, p < .005. Because any combination of the two variables indicating
percentage of habitat in federal, state, or private ownership uniquely determined the third vari-
able, the regression equation included only two predictor variables. The regression predicted
3.4% of the variance in the dependent variable (adjusted). Controlling for the years that a
species had been protected revealed that the two ownership variables independently explained
3.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, which was a significant increase. F(2, 286) =
4.13, p < .05.
102 F(13, 274) = 2.02, p < .025. The regression predicted 4.4% of the variance in the
dependent variable (adjusted). Controlling for the years that a species had been protected
revealed that the fourteen ownership variables independently explained 7.8% of the variance in
the dependent variable, which was not a significant increase. F(13, 275) = 1.56, p > .10. This
suggests that the detailed pattern of land ownership did not predict species status except inas-
much as it indicated which species had been protected longer. The effect could have run in the
reverse direction, however (species protected longer were in better condition, in part, because
they were more likely to be found on certain types of land).
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ing, as opposed to stable, although this regression approached signifi-
cance.103  The fourteen different landowner percentages did not
significantly predict whether a species was improving, as opposed to
stable.1o4
None of the individual beta coefficients for the ownership variables
were significant in the regression equations predicting whether a species
was stable or improving, as opposed to declining. The ownership vari-
ables, however, were necessarily inversely correlated-the greater the
percentage of a species' habitat held by the federal government, the
lower the percentage held by the states and by private parties. Thus,
instead of analyzing the coefficients in the regression equations, the cor-
relations between the ownership variables and whether a species was sta-
ble or improving, as opposed to declining, were directly assessed. Table
4 reports these correlations.10 5
TABLE 4: CORRELATION BETWEEN THE PERCENTAGE OF HABITAT HELD
BY EACH LANDOWNER TYPE AND WHETHER A SPECIES WAS STABLE
OR IMPROVING (As OPPOSED TO DECLNING) (N=290)
Federal State Private
Landowner Correlation Landowner Correlation Landowner Correlation
All Federal .20* All State -. 09 All Private -. 12"
BLM .13* State Preserve -. 05 Resid./Comm. -. 16"
USFS .09t State Park -. 07 Agriculture .05
NPS .01 State Misc. -. 02 Grazing -. 1it
NWR .12* Undeveloped .08
DOD .09 Private Reserve -. 02
Indian -. 04
* statistically significant correlation (p < .05) t approached statistical significance (p < .10)
In Table 4, a positive correlation indicates that the more land held
by that type of landowner, the more likely species were to be stable or
103 F(2, 144) = 2.80, p < .10. The regression predicted 2.4% of the variance in the depen-
dent variable (adjusted). Controlling for the years that a species had been protected revealed
that the two ownership variables independently explained 4.3% of the variance in the depen-
dent variable, which was a significant increase. F(2, 143) = 3.31, p < .05.
104 F(13, 133) = 1.56, p = .10. The regression predicted 4.8% of the variance in the
dependent variable (adjusted). Controlling for the years that a species had been protected
revealed that the 14 ownership variables independently explained 12.3% variance in the de-
pendent variable, which was not a significant increase. F(13, 132) = 1.47, p > .10.
105 The fourteen variables indicating percentage of ownership obviously also correlated
with each other; any one variable was equal to 100 minus the sum of the other 13. This was
also true of the three composite variables (each of which was equal to 100 minus the sum of
the other two). As such, each correlation coefficient overstates the unique ability of that pa-
rameter with the species status, but completely teasing aside the multicolinearity among the
ownership variables was impossible.
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improving, as opposed to declining. 10 6 Overall, the percentage of habitat
held by the federal government correlated positively with whether spe-
cies were stable or improving, as opposed to declining. Conversely, the
percentage of habitat held by private parties correlated negatively with
whether species were stable or improving, as opposed to declining. The
percentage of habitat held by states and territories did not correlate with
species status. Among the ownership sub-categories, the percentage of
habitat held by the BLM and by a NWR correlated positively with
whether species were stable or improving, as opposed to declining. To a
lesser extent, the percentage of land held by the USFS and the DoD also
correlated positively with whether species were stable or improving, as
opposed to declining. On private property, the percentage of habitat sub-
ject to residential and commercial development correlated negatively
with whether species were stable or improving, as opposed to declining.
The percentage of habitat held as private grazing land showed a slight
negative correlation with whether species were stable or improving, as
opposed to declining. The percentage of habitat held by private trusts
did not correlate with species status.
Among those species that were either stable or improving, the corre-
lations between whether a species was improving, as opposed to stable,
were assessed only for the three composite landowners because the more
detailed pattern did not significantly predict this variable. The correla-
tions were -. 01 for the federal percentage, -. 17 for the state percentage,
and +.15 for the private percentage.107
106 To test whether the significant correlations were attributable to differences in the
number of years that species on different types of land had been protected, a regression equa-
tion predicting species status (stable or improving, as opposed to declining) from the years that
species had been protected was compared to regression equations that use both the years a
species had been protected and the percentage of habitat in each ownership status. The per-
centage of habitat in federal ownership explained an additional 2.7% of the variance in the
dependent variable, which was significant. F(1, 287) = 8.30, p < .01. The private ownership
percentage explained an additional 1.1% of the variance in species status, which was margin-
ally significant. F(l, 287) = 3.32, p < .10. Among the 14 individual variables, the percentage
of habitat held by the NWR, residential and commercial land, and grazing land each explained
a significant amount of variance independently of the number of years that species had been
protected (2.5%, 2.9%, and 2.8%, respectively). F(l, 287)= 4.55, p < .05; F(l, 287) = 5.78, p
< .05; and F(l, 287) = 5.48, p < .05, respectively. The percentage of habitat held by the BLM
explained an additional 1.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, which was marginally
significant. F(1,287) = 3.3 2,p <.10. The percentages of land held by the USFS and the DoD
explained only an additional 0.8% and 0.4% of the variance in the dependent variable, respec-
tively. Neither of these increases was significant. F(1, 287) = 2.41, p > .10; F(1, 287) = 1.20,
p > .25.
107 The federal correlation was not significant, t(146) = 0.25, p >.5; the state correlation
was significant, t(146) = 2.08, p < .05; and the private correlation approached significance,
t(146) = 1.78, p <.10. Once the years that species had been protected was accounted for, the
percentage of habitat held by the states and territories explained an additional 2.4% of the
variance in the dependent variable, which approached significance. F(l, 144) = 3.65, p <.10.
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Table 5 reports the distribution of species status by dominant land-
owner type. 08 The distributions of species status differed significantly
between the three types of landowners. 10 9 Only 36.1% of those species
that relied predominantly on federal land were declining, whereas more
than half of the species that relied predominantly on state and private
land were declining. Among species that relied predominantly on federal
land, however, the percentage of species that were improving (15.3%)
was comparable'to the percentage of species that were improving among
species that relied predominantly on private land (14.4%).
TABLE 5: SPECIES STATUS BY PREDOM4INANT LANDOWNER
Status Predominant Landowner Percentage and Number
Federal State Private
Improving 15.3 (11) 4.4 (2) 14.4 (22)
Stable 48.6 (35) 37.8 (17) 32.0 (49)
Declining 36.1 (26) 57.8 (26) 53.6 (82)
Total 100.0 (72) 100.0 (45) 100.0 (153)
Most of the land held by federal and state entities were used in dif-
ferent ways from land held by private parties, which might have ac-
counted for the differences in the status of species. Completely
controlling for the different uses of these lands was not possible because
many federal uses, such as national parks and military bases, have no
private analogs. Although USFS land is somewhat comparable to pri-
The percentage of habitat in private ownership explained an additional 3.5% of the variance in
the dependent variable, which was also significant. F(1, 144) = 5.38, p <.025.
108 Ties were removed from this analysis. For 48 species, two of the composite types of
owners held equal amounts of land. Among these, 11 species had equal amounts of habitat on
federal and state land, 10 had equal amounts of habitat on federal and private land, and 27 had
equal amounts of habitat on state and private land. Most of these species had an unknown
status, and hence their removal did not affect the analysis. Removing the ties, however, did
remove nine species that were declining (one federal-state tie, two federal-private ties, and six
state-private ties), 10 species that were stable (three federal-state ties, five federal-private ties,
and two state-private ties), and one species that was improving (a federal-private tie).
109 X2(4) = 10.4, p < .05. Species with habitat that was predominantly federal were pro-
tected, on average, longer (8.03 years) than species with habitat that was predominantly state
(4.96 years) or private (6.73 years). Once the years that species had been protected were
accounted for, the dominant owner did not influence species status as being stable or improv-
ing, as opposed to declining. Two variables coded to indicate the dominant owner indepen-
dently explained an additional 1.0% of the variance in the dependent variable, which was not
significant. F(2, 267) = 1.40, p >.10. The dominant owner did, however, independently ex-
plain an additional 4.2% of the variance in whether species status was improving, as opposed
to stable, once the years that species had been protected was controlled, which was significant
F(2, 132) = 3.69, p <.05. The beta coefficients in the regression were negative for the dummy
codes identifying species that were found predominantly on federal and state land, which indi-
cated that species found predominantly on private land were more likely to be improving, as
opposed to stable, than were species found predominantly on federal or state land.
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vately owned forest land, only a handful of species (all in Florida) had
habitat in private forests. Nevertheless, some comparisons were possi-
ble; the analysis includes data on NWRs and private refuges, and on
BLM land (which is primarily used for grazing) and private grazing land.
As noted in Table 4, the percentage of habitat on a NWR correlated with
whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to declining,
while the percentage of habitat on private wildlife refuges had no effect
on this variable. The difference between these two correlation coeffi-
cients was not significant, although there was a strong trend. 110 To
sharpen the comparison between BLM land and private grazing land,
BLM land-used as grazing land was identified from the Federal Register
announcements."' As indicated in Table 4, the greater the percentage of
habitat held privately as grazing land, the less likely a species was to be
stable or improving, although the correlation (-.11) only approached sig-
nificance. The amount of habitat held by the BLM and used exclusively
for grazing correlated positively with whether a species was stable or
improving (+.10), which also only approached significance. 1 2 Despite
the fact that neither the private grazing nor the BLM grazing percentages
correlated significantly with species status, these two correlation coeffi-
cients were significantly different from each other.113 Thus, in both
cases where federal-private comparisons were possible, federal land was
more beneficial to listed plant species than private land.
3. The Effect of State Law on Private Land
Among the 290 species with a known status, forty species were
found predominantly in jurisdictions with statutes that prohibit private
landowners from taking protected plants ("restriction" statutes), thirty
were found predominantly in jurisdictions with statutes that require the
landowner to notify a state agency before taking protected plants ("no-
tice" statutes), eighty-five were found predominantly in jurisdictions
with statutes that do not restrict landowners but prohibit others from tak-
ing species without a landowner's permission ("permission" statutes),
I 1o t(287) = 1.62, p > .10. The statistical test to determine whether correlation coefficients
differ significantly is described in CoHEN & CoHEN, supra note 93, at 53-57. After controlling
for the years that species had been protected, a regression analysis, including the percentage of
habitat in a NWR and in a private refuge, explained an additional 1.5% of the variance in the
dependent variable, which approached significance. F(2, 287) = 2.28, p < .10.
111 Of the 61 species found on any BLM land, 50 were found on that used for grazing.
112 t(289) = 1.62, p = .11.
113 t(287) = 2.30,p <.025. After controlling for the years that species had been protected,
a regression analysis including the percentage of habitat held by private parties for grazing and
by the BLM for grazing, explained an additional 2.4% of the variance in the dependent varia-
ble, which was significant. F(2, 287) = 3.52, p < .05.
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and 135 were found predominantly in jurisdictions without any statutes
protecting plants.' 14
Table 6 describes the status of species found predominantly on pri-
vately owned land under the four different types of state or territorial
law. In those jurisdictions with restriction statutes, only 25.0% of spe-
cies were declining, whereas in the other jurisdictions, 56.0% were de-
clining. These two distributions differed significantly from each
other. 115 In those jurisdictions that do not restrict landowners, the distri-
bution of species status did not differ significantly among species found
in jurisdictions with the three different types of law.116
TABLE 6: SPECiES STATUS AMONG SPECIES FouND PREDOMINANTLY
ON PRIVATE LAND AMONG THE JURISDICTIONs WITH FoUR DIFFERENT
TYPES OF LAWS
Status State Endangered Plant Law
No Restriction Statute
All Jurisdictions
Without
Restriction Restriction Notice Permission No
Statute Statutes Statute Statute Protection
Improving 8.3 (1) 14.9 (21) 7.1 (1) 21.0 (13) 10.8 (7)
Stable 66.7 (8) 29.1 (41) 35.7 (5) 32.3 (20) 24.6 (16)
Declining 25.0 (3) 56.0 (79) 57.1 (8) 46.8 (29) 64.6 (42)
Total 100.0 (12) 100.0 (141) 100.0 (14) 100.0 (62) 100.0 (65)
a. The Effect of Restriction Statutes
Table 7 reports the coefficients showing the correlation between the
percentage of habitat held by private parties and whether a species was
stable or improving, as opposed to declining, among the forty species in
jurisdictions with restriction statutes and among the 250 species in the
other jurisdictions. Table 7 also includes the results of a statistical test to
determine whether the two correlation coefficients differed. Due to the
small sample size, statistics are not reported for the relationship between
the percentage of habitat held by private parties and whether a species
114 Included among these 135 species are two species in Virginia and 18 species in Cali-
fornia that these states do not recognize as protected species.
115 c2(2) = 7.20, p < .05. This trend could not be accounted for by the length of time that
species found predominantly on private land had been protected, as the species in jurisdictions
with restriction statutes were protected for less time on average, than species in other jurisdic-
tions (4.2 years versus 6.9 years, respectively).
116 c(4) = 5.52, p > .10.
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was improving, as opposed to stable, in the two different types of
jurisdictions. 117
TABLE 7: EFFECT OF STATE RESTRICTIONS ON PRIVATE LANDOWNERS
ON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF HABITAT HELD BY EACH
LANDOWNER TYPE AND WHETHER A SPECIES WAS STABLE OR
IMPROviNG (As OPPOSED TO DECLINING)
Correlation Between Percentage of Habitat Held by Each
Landowner Type and Species Being Stable or Improving
Landowner (As Opposed to Declining)
Unrestricted Restricted
(n = 250) (n = 40) z statistic
All Private -. 14 .12 1.53
ResidJComm. -. 21 .27 2.74**
Agriculture .04 .20 1.65t
Grazing -. 09 -. 22 0.77
Undeveloped .09 .02 0.42
Private Reserve -. 02 .30 1.87t
t approached statistical significance ( p < .10)
** statistically significant ( p < .01)
The analysis revealed a trend for restriction statutes to mitigate the
correlation between being on private land and being in decline. 118 On
residential and commercial land, which had the most adverse effect on
species status, the correlation between the percentage of species habitat
and species status (stable or improving, as opposed to declining) was
reversed in jurisdictions with restriction statutes. The correlation be-
tween the percentage of habitat held in residential and commercial prop-
erty and whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to
declining, was +.27 in those jurisdictions with restriction statutes, and
was -. 21 in those jurisdictions without restriction statutes. Agricultural
land and land in private reserves also had different effects on species
status in jurisdictions with restriction statutes than on species status in
other jurisdictions without restriction statutes. Only grazing land showed
the reverse trend, which was not significant.
117 Of the 40 species with a known status in jurisdictions with restriction statutes, 23 were
found on any private land, and of these, only 13 were either stable or improving. Nevertheless,
the correlation between the percentage of habitat in private ownership and whether a species
was improving, as opposed to stable, was zero among species in jurisdictions with restriction
statutes and +.17 among species in the other jurisdictions. This difference was not significant.
z = 0.69, p > .5.
118 This trend could not be accounted for by the length of time that species had been
protected, as the species in jurisdictions with restriction statutes had been protected for less
time, on average, than species in other jurisdictions (4.5 years versus 4.8 years, respectively).
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Two jurisdictions, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, provide a good test of
the impact of restriction statutes on protected plants. Although both are
tropical island ecosystems with high concentrations of endangered and
threatened plants, they have different legal rules regarding these plants.
Hawaii forbids private landowners from harming protected plants on
their property, while Puerto Rico has no laws protecting endangered
plants. As Table 8 shows, listed plants fare significantly better in Hawaii
than in Puerto Rico.
TABLE 8: SPECIES STATUS AMONG SPECIES IN HAWAII
AND PUERTO RCO
Status Jurisdiction
Hawaii Puerto Rico
Improving 8.8 (3) 0.0 (0)
Stable 41.2 (14) 19.4 (7)
Declining 50.0 (17) 80.6 (29)
Total 100.0 (34) 100.0 (36)
Although fifty percent of Hawaiian species with a known status
were declining, over eighty percent of Puerto Rican species with a
known status were declining. The difference between these two distribu-
tions was significant. 119 All fourteen species that relied predominantly
on private land in Puerto Rico were declining, but in Hawaii three such
species were declining, three were stable, and one was improving.' 20 In
Puerto Rico, the correlation between the percentage of habitat in private
ownership and whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to
declining, was -. 36, whereas in Hawaii it was zero. 121
b. The Effect of Permission Statutes
Table 9 reports the coefficients showing the correlation between the
percentage of habitat held by private parties and whether a species was
stable or improving, as opposed to declining, among species found pri-
marily in jurisdictions with permission or notice statutes and in jurisdic-
119 X2 (1) = 8.41, p < .005. Due to the small sample size and the absence of any improv-
ing species in Puerto Rico, this test had to be performed on whether a species was stable or
improving, as opposed to declining, instead of using all three categories. After controlling for
the number of years that species had been protected, a regression analysis, which included a
binary variable indicating whether a species was Hawaiian or Puerto Rican, independently
explained an additional 4.6% of the variance in species status (stable or improving, as opposed
to declining), which was significant. F(1, 67) = 4.04, p < .05.
120 When combining the stable and improving species, these two distributions were sig-
nificantly different. X2(1) = 9.88, p < .005.
121 These coefficients did not differ significantly, although there was a trend towards a
significant difference. z = 1.52, p = .13.
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tions without statutes protecting listed plants. 122 Table 9 also reports the
correlation coefficients between the percentage of habitat held by private
parties and whether a species was improving, as opposed to stable,
among the species found primarily in each of these two types of jurisdic-
tions. Finally, Table 9 includes statistical tests indicating whether the
two correlation coefficients differed significantly.
TABLE 9: EFFECT OF STATE LAW REQUIRING PERMISSION OF PRIVATE
LANDOWNERS ON CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF HABrrAT
HELD BY EACH PRIVATE LANDOWNER TYPE AND WHETHER A SPECIES
WAS STABLE OR IMPROVING (As OPPOSED TO DECLINING)
Correlation Between Percentage of
Habitat Held by Each Landowner Correlation Between Percentage of
Type and Being Stable or Habitat Held by Each Landowner
Improving (As Opposed Type and Being Improving (As
Landowner to Declining) Opposed to Stable)
No No
Protection Permission Protection Permission
(n = 135) (n = 115) z statistic (n = 64) (n = 60) z statistic
All Private -. 25 -. 03 1.81t .33 -. 07 2.25*
ResidlComm. -. 27 -. 15 1.03 .25 -. 05 1.67t
Agriculture -. 08 .15 1.80t -. 02 -. 03 0.04
Grazing -. 12 -. 02 0.83 .25 -. 16 2.29*
Undeveloped .10 .08 0.17 -. 05 .02 0.36
Private Reserve .03 -. 09 0.92 .25 .06 1.05
t approached statistical significance (p < .10)
* statistically significant (p <.05)
** statistically significant (p < .01)
The results reported in Table 9 indicate that permission statutes ben-
efit species. 123 Overall, the analysis revealed a non-significant trend in-
dicating that the correlation between percentage of habitat in private
ownership and whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to
declining, was less negative among species in jurisdictions with permis-
sion statutes. This trend resulted primarily from the impact of agricul-
tural land on species status, which showed a small positive correlation in
those jurisdictions with permission statutes and a negative correlation in
jurisdictions with no statutes protecting endangered plants. Perhaps
more importantly, the analysis revealed a strong trend for private owner-
122 For this analysis, the species in jurisdictions with notice statutes were combined with
the species in jurisdictions with permission statutes, as the notice statutes also forbid taking
protected species from private property without the permission of the owner.
123 This trend could not be accounted for by the length of time that species had been
protected, as species in jurisdictions with permission statutes were protected, on average, for
about as long as species in jurisdictions without any such laws (4.87 years versus 4.88 years,
respectively).
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ship of habitat to correlate with whether a species was improving, as
opposed to stable, in jurisdictions with permission statutes.
c. The Effect of Notice Statutes
Table 10 reports the coefficients showing the correlation between
the percentage of habitat held by private parties and whether a species
was stable or improving, as opposed to declining, among species pro-
tected by the notice statutes in Arizona and California and among those
species found primarily in the thirteen jurisdictions with permission stat-
utes. Table 10 also reports the results of a statistical test indicating
whether the two coefficients differed. Due to the small sample size, sta-
tistics are not reported for the relationship between the percentage of
habitat held by private parties in the two different types of jurisdictions
and whether a species was improving, as opposed to stable. 124
TABLE 10: EFFECT OF STATE NOTIFICATION STATUTES ON
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN PERCENTAGE OF HABITAT HELD BY EACH
LANDOWNER TYPE AND WHETHER A SPECIES WAS STABLE OR
IMPROVING (As OPPOSED TO DECLINING)
Correlation Between Percentage of Habitat Held by
Each Landowner Type and Being Stable or Improving
Landowner (As Opposed to Declining)
Notification
Required Permission
(n = 30) (n = 85) z statistic
All Private -. 09 -. 03 0.30
Resid./Comm. -. 11 -. 16 0.21
Agriculture .17 .14 0.09
Grazing -. 16 .01 0.75
Undeveloped -. 17 .11 1.30
Private Reserve .16 -. 16 1.43
As Table 10 shows, the notice statutes in California and Arizona did
not change the impact of private ownership of habitat on species status.
California provides a good test of the effect of notice statutes be-
cause the state does not automatically protect federally listed species, and
it has left seventeen federally listed species off of its own list of protected
species. As Table 11 indicates, California's statutes had little effect on
124 Only 30 species with a known status were protected by the California and Arizona
notice statutes, and only 15 of these species were on private land. Six of these species were
stable or improving.
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federally listed plants in that state. 125 Once the length of time that spe-
cies had been protected was accounted for, species that California pro-
tects were in worse condition than species that the State does not
protect. 126
TABLE 11: SPECIES STATUS AMONG PROTECTED AND UNPROTECTED
SPECIES IN CALIPORIA
Status Protection in California
Protected Unprotected
Improving 20.7 (6) 14.3 (2)
Stable 27.6 (8) 50.0 (7)
Declining 51.7 (15) 35.7 (5)
Total 100.0 (29) 100.0 (14)
Among California species found predominantly on private land, two
unprotected species were declining, one was stable, and one was improv-
ing; in comparison, eight protected species were declining, five were sta-
ble, and one was improving.' 27 Among unprotected species in
California, the correlation between the percentage of habitat in private
ownership and whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to
declining, was -. 27; the correlation among protected species was -. 13.
These two correlation coefficients did not differ significantly.128 Species
in California do not benefit from the State's notice statute.
d. Species on Wetlands
The analysis produced no evidence that private landowners destroy
species on wetlands in order to avoid federal restrictions. As described
in Table 12, wetland species were in significantly better condition than
non-wetland species, 129 even among species found predominantly on
private land. 130 The correlations between the percentage of habitat held
125 X(1) = 0.97, p > .5. Due to the small sample size, this test had to be performed
whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to declining, instead of using all three
categories.
126 After controlling for the years that species had been protected, a regression analysis
including a binary variable indicating whether the species was protected or not in California,
explained an additional 11.3% of the variance in whether a species was stable or improving, as
opposed to declining, which was significant. F(l, 40)= 6.29, p <.05. The beta coefficient for
the binary variable indicating whether a species was protected showed that species were more
likely to be declining if they were protected than if they were not.
127 The small sample size precluded conducting a meaningful statistical test.
128 z = 1.13, p > .25. The sample size was small, however, as only eight unprotected
species and 15 protected species had any presence on private land in California.
129 X2(2) = 6.96, p < .05.
130 X(1) = 3.88, p < .05. Due to the small sample size, this test was performed on
whether a species was stable or improving, as opposed to declining, instead of using all three
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by private landowners and whether a species was stable or improving, as
opposed to declining, was -. 13 among non-wetland species and -. 02
among wetland species. These correlations were not significantly
different.131
TABLE 12: SPECIES STATUS AMONG WETLAND AND NON-WETLAND
SPECIES OVERALL AND AMONG SPECIES THAT RELY PREDOMINANTLY
ON PRrVATE LAND
Status All Species Private Land Species
Wetland Non-Wetland Wetland Non-Wetland
Imlroving 11.5 (3) 12.5 (33) 14.3 (2) 14.4 (20)
Stable 61.5 (16) 36.0 (95) 57.1 (8) 29.5 (41)
Declining 26.9 (7) 51.5 (136) 28.6 (4) 56.1 (78)
Total 100.0 (26) 100.0 (264) 100.0 (14) 100.0 (139)
C. DIsCUSSION
The data described in this paper clearly support the hypothesis that
restrictions on private landowners benefit endangered and threatened
species. Although the FWS's land-use restrictions might create incen-
tives to harm species in some cases, these restrictions have a net positive
effect across all listed species. The data suggest that in the absence of
land-use restrictions, private landowners do more harm than good to en-
dangered and threatened species. Even if some landowners voluntarily
preserve endangered and threatened species, the tendency of other land-
owners to destroy species habitat outweighs any benefit from these
efforts.
Several parts of the analysis involved in the experiment support this
conclusion. Plant species on private land generally fared much worse
than plant species on federal land. This result is seen most directly in the
comparison of BLM land and private grazing land; on land-used for sim-
ilar purposes, species on federal land were better off. Furthermore, the
greater the percentage of species' habitat that consisted of private land,
the more likely that species was to be in decline, particularly if the land
was subject to commercial or residential development. This effect was
reversed, however, in those jurisdictions with statutes restricting private
landowners.
categories. This effect could not be accounted for by the length of time that species had been
protected, as the wetland species found predominantly on private land were protected for less
time, on average, than the non-wetland species found predominantly on private land (5.6 years
versus 6.9 years, respectively).
131 z = .51, p > 5.
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Other types of statutes designed to protect plants had only a mildly
beneficial effect. Permission statutes somewhat mitigated the adverse ef-
fects of private land ownership on species status. As shown in Table 6,
however, the permission statutes did not prevent species found predomi-
nantly on private land from declining. Similarly, the data revealed that
the innovative "notice" statutes in California and Arizona did not provide
much benefit to plant species.
Land-use restrictions arrest species' decline, but they do not pro-
mote species recovery. Even in those jurisdictions that restrict private
landowners, only a handful of species were improving. In jurisdictions
with "permission" statutes, species that were at least stable tended to be
improving more than in other jurisdictions. This result suggests that
some landowners voluntarily protect endangered plants on their property,
and that permission statutes assist them in their efforts.
The analysis also included an ambiguous result; overall, the condi-
tion of animal species was comparable to that of plant species. If the
ESA's land-use restrictions benefit species, then plants should have fared
worse than animals because such restrictions do not protect plants. Nu-
merous differences, however, between plants and animals might explain
this result. For example, this crude, inter-kingdom comparison did not
account for the type of land that each kingdom relied on for habitat.
Because of a lack of data, the ownership of animal species' habitat could
not be identified with as much accuracy as the plants species' habitat.
Therefore, a direct test of the effect of land ownership on animals was
not possible. This result is ambiguous, however, because it also fails to
support the alternative hypothesis that land-use restrictions harm species.
Another curious pair of findings in the analysis were the effects of
state and territorial ownership of habitat and the effects of private habitat
preserves. State and territorial ownership had little overall effect on spe-
cies status; it was neither beneficial nor harmful. If states vary widely in
their treatment of endangered plants, then this aggregate result is not sur-
prising. Some states are interested in promoting growth while others
wish to further conservationist goals. Lumping states together in this
analysis might have obfuscated the effects of different attitudes with
which states approach the issue of conserving endangered species. Pri-
vate land trusts are likewise subject to other influences not controlled in
the present analysis. If private conservation organizations direct their
efforts towards those plants in the greatest danger of extinction, then it is
not surprising that the species on their properties are declining overall,
even if individual populations have stabilized on such land.
Although the analysis generally supports the hypothesis that restric-
tions on private landowners benefit protected species, alternative expla-
nations for the observed pattern of data are also possible. First, as noted
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earlier, species status is a suspect variable. The type of landowner might
influence the FWS's determination of species status. For example, if the
FWS believes that species fare better on federal land, then it might have
been more likely to assign a species on federal land a stable or improving
status than a species on state or private land. Furthermore, the FWS
might assign a species a better status if it is found in jurisdictions that
protect plants. Without a more objective measure of species status, such
explanations cannot be dismissed.
Second, after a species is listed, additional populations of the spe-
cies might be easier to find on public land than on private land. The
present analysis uses the ownership of habitat at the time of listing, but
the FWS determination of species status doubtless included all known
species populations in 1994. The discovery of a thriving new population
of a species after listing could lead the FWS to identify the species status
as improving, even if the species has not actually improved. If such dis-
coveries are more commonly made on federal land than on private land,
then species on federal land would appear to be in better condition than
species on private land, even in the absence of any real difference. This
effect does not explain why species on private land in jurisdictions that
restrict private landowners fared better than species in other jurisdictions.
This phenomenon, however, could have resulted from jurisdictions with
restriction statutes devoting more resources to finding populations of
protected species. More detailed data on which sub-populations of plant
species are thriving or failing is necessary to control for these effects.
Third, it is not entirely clear whether private landowners in jurisdic-
tions without restriction statutes actually know that they are allowed to
remove protected plants. The public rhetoric on the ESA often leaves the
impression that the presence of listed plants on private property creates
land-use restrictions. Some newspaper articles and a leading book on the
ESA make this assertion. 132 Comments submitted to the FWS, including
comments by sophisticated organizations, in opposition to the listing of
plants sometimes cite the prospect of land-use restrictions as a reason not
to list a plant. 133 On the other hand, anecdotal evidence indicates that at
least some developers are aware that listed plants do not generally create
132 See, e.g., MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 5, at 187 (describing efforts to avoid the
restrictions on private landowners caused by the presence of an endangered plant); Erin Kelly,
As Senate Seeks Endangered Species Agreement, Some in House on Different Road, GANN=T
Naws SERVIcE, June 4, 1997, at ARC ('The Endangered Species Act... outlaws the destruc-
tion of endangered plants or animals on public or private land."); Daniel Sneider, Endangered
Species Act Proves to be a Survivor, CHICAGO SuN-Taims, Feb. 23, 1997, at 26 (describing the
prohibition against "harn" in the ESA as applying to endangered plants).
133 See, e.g., Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; The Plant, Water Howellia
(Howellia Aquatilis), Determined To Be a Threatened Species, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,860 (1994)
(cattleman's association expressed concern that listing a plant would interfere with grazing by
private landowners on their property).
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land-use restrictions.13 4 If private landowners do not recognize a distinc-
tion in the law between listed plants and animals, then the results of these
analyses must be the spurious product of some other effect.
Fourth, it is not clear that the conclusions of this analysis, which
were drawn primarily from data on listed plants, would also apply to
animals. It might be that plants are relatively unobtrusive, and do not
create adverse incentives, even though animals do. Maintaining animal
habitat might be more costly than simply avoiding the destruction of
plants. Furthermore, some animals, such as wolves, grizzly bears, and
prairie dogs, harm the economic interests of the owners of the land that
they occupy, which might make landowners more inclined to eliminate
them.
Finally, one jurisdiction heavily influenced the results of this analy-
sis. Hawaiian species accounted for thirty-four of the forty species with
a known status in jurisdictions with restriction statutes.135Any of the
many differences between species in Hawaii and species in other juris-
dictions, aside from the differences in endangered plant laws, might ac-
count for the generally stable condition of the Hawaiian plants. Plants in
a similar tropical environment in Puerto Rico, however, did not do as
well as the Hawaiian plants, which might be attributable to the difference
in law. This result suggests that at least some of the stability in Hawaiian
plants results from Hawaiian law.
Conclusions about the benefits of restricting private landowners
should be made with these caveats in mind. No aspect of the data, how-
ever, supports the theory that restrictions on private landowners have a
net negative effect on protected species. For example, in wetlands,
where the ESA creates powerful incentives for landowners to eliminate
listed plants, the analysis reveals no evidence of any adverse conse-
quences attributable to land-use restrictions. Even if restrictions on pri-
vate landowners create unwanted incentives, the benefits of such
restrictions to protected plants apparently outweigh any harm that these
unwanted incentives may inflict.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Critics of the ESA present a solid theoretical case against imposing
restrictions on private landowners as a way of protecting endangered spe-
cies. Such restrictions make harboring protected species costly to private
134 See, e.g., Jonathan Brinckman, Golf Course Developers Hook Around Rare Plant,
PoRTLAND OREG ONAN, June 12, 1998, at B4 (describing voluntary efforts by golf course de-
signers to save a population of a listed plant).
135 Three species were in Michigan, two were in Minnesota, and one was in Iowa.
Although other plants grew in these and other jurisdictions with restriction statutes, these spe-
cies either did not have a known status or only part of their habitat was in these jurisdictions.
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landowners. Other than anecdotes, however, there is no evidence to sup-
port the conclusion that these restrictions actually harm species. They
might be responsible for the ESA's failure to spur improvements in the
condition of listed species, as landowners who do not currently harbor
protected species ensure that these species cannot inhabit their property.
But the FWS does not list a species because its populations are failing to
increase; the FWS lists a species because its populations are crashing.
Listed species have an immediate need for a stable habitat, which the
ESA seems to provide. In short, the data support the conclusion that the
ESA does what it says-it prevents the further destruction of the habitat
of endangered and threatened species.
This conclusion implies that the likely consequences of eliminating
the FWS's regulations restricting private landowners would be to drive
more species into extinction. Even if some landowners would volunta-
rily protect species but for the prospect of federal regulation of their land,
the present analysis suggests that many more landowners would use
habitat in ways that harm listed species.
Finally, what of the plight of endangered and threatened plants?
Most of the listed plants on private land outside Hawaii are sliding to-
wards extinction without hope of rescue. Listing does little or nothing
for these plants, except perhaps identify them to the landowner as a nui-
sance that has to be'eliminated before a federal or state permit can be
obtained. Altering the ESA or the FWS regulations to protect plants in
the same way that animals are protected would be politically difficult.
Even if it were possible, landowners would probably be able to rid their
property of listed plants before any such change in the law took place.
Thus, it seems unlikely that the law will change or even that such a
change would be desirable. If many of the listed plants survive, it will be
because of expanded federal, state, and private preservation programs.
Some commentators note that the failure to protect plants reflects an
implicit societal decision that preserving plants is less important than
preserving animals.136 This decision effectively relegates the fate of
many endangered plants to the preferences of private landowners. Ulti-
mately, the fate of these plants will provide a continuing test of whether
private landowners voluntarily accommodate endangered species. The
analysis in this paper suggests that the outcome of this test will be a
continuous stream of extinctions.
136 See, e.g., John Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MNN. L. REv. 1171, 1193 (1998).
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